In this demonstration we present a novel encryption scheme for enforcing access control in a Discovery Service. A Discovery Service is a piece of software that allows one to "discover" item-level data which is stored in data repositories of different companies. Such data can be gathered with the help of Radio Frequency Identification or 2D bar codes. Our software allows the data owner to enforce access control on an item-level by managing the corresponding keys. Data remains confidential even against the provider of the Discovery Service. We present three ways of querying data and evaluate them with databases containing up to 50 million tuples.
INTRODUCTION
More and more companies are implementing item-level tracking in their supply chains using Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) [4] or 2D bar codes. Each RFID tag or bar code carries a unique identifier for each good [14] . Companies are collecting information about the items they handle by scanning the identifier and recording it in their data repositories. Each tuple recorded consists of the item identifier, a timestamp, the location and situation-specific data.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. The full benefit of this information can be gained when companies exchange their item-level data. For instance, applications like anti-counterfeiting [7] and targeted batch recalls [15] require that the path of each single item is tracked along the supply chain. This cannot be achieved with aggregated data. Despite the potential of such new applications, companies are reluctant to share item-level data [2, 13] . This is because strategic relations or best practices might be inferred from the data. Furthermore, companies may suffer consequences for unfair behavior. Because of that companies need to selectively exchange item-level data with other companies in the supply chain.
There are two main methods of exchanging item-level data: storing data locally at each company (distributed repositories), and storing the data centrally (central repository). These methods are discussed in detail in the following section. In summary, none of these methods is satisfactory:
1. Distributed Repositories: When data is distributed, one has to first "discover" which company and thereby which repositories contain data about each item [1] . This makes data access slower. And the discovery itself can reveal sensitive information.
Central Repository:
A central repository does not require discovery. However, the data owner has to relinquish access control to the repository provider.
In this demonstration we present a novel encryption scheme for exchanging item-level data in a distributed data repository. It extends an existing encryption scheme used for central repositories [10, 11] . The modified encryption scheme enables the data owners to enforce access control over their data, prevents observers of the Discovery Service to infer any information and enables efficient queries on the stored data. It thereby reconciliates the conflict between security and performance in item-level data repositories.
EXCHANGING ITEM-LEVEL DATA
As already mentioned, there are two main methods of exchanging item-level data: (1) storing data locally at each company, and (2) storing the data centrally. For the sake of completeness, we also consider (3) storing the data on an RFID tag [12] . Distributed Repositories: Item-level data is usually partitioned horizontally and tuples corresponding to one item are spread across a number of repositories, e.g. because each company will store the data it gathers in its own repository.
Nevertheless, the typical query searches for all tuples corresponding to one item (pedigree). Locating the repositories that contain information about one item is difficult. This is because companies usually do not know the complete supply chain of each item, such that they have to "discover" which companies possessed which items [1] . Proposals have been made for discovery servers that contain an index over all repositories [3, 1] . However, they do not provide the appropriate level of security. Furthermore, data access becomes slower since data repositories have to be discovered before data can be queried.
Central Repository: When data is stored centrally, there is no need to locate the repositories. However, the data owner looses the control over who can access his data. He has to trust that the repository provider will enforce the access control as specified. And if the repository is compromised, all data about the whole supply chain might be revealed. Since business critical information can be inferred from this data, companies need to stay in control over their data.
Data-on-Tag: While companies can easily exchange data by storing it on the RFID tags, it poses many security risks. If data is unencrypted, it might be read at any time by any person. If data is encrypted, key management becomes a problem. Furthermore, the information flow is only in one direction, i.e. from manufacturer to consumer, and data cannot be updated after an item leaves your company.
OVERVIEW OF OUR DEMO
We target a scenario with a distributed repository using a Discovery Service. Our demonstration extends a previous method [10, 11] designed for central repositories. Our security requirements for the Discovery Service are 1. A party observing the Discovery Service should not be able to track items.
2. A party should be able to enforce fine-grained visibility policies on its items.
The first requirement is important in order to protect against attacks introduced by the use of a Discovery Service. One can imagine an attacker that continuously monitors the Discovery Service and tries to infer as much information as possible. We would like to prevent such an attacker from gaining any information.
The second requirement implies fine-grained access control policies. It is a functional requirement on the security mechanism. A data owner has different trust relationships with different parties and he should be able to set the access control policies accordingly. In particular, we map the policy model of visibility policies to the following levels of access control:
A1: for each tuple A2: for each party, all tuples corresponding to items that the party possessed A3: for each party, all tuples corresponding to items that the data owner previously possessed
These levels are a subset of visibility policies [6] which have been defined for mobile physical objects, such as goods in a supply chain, and can be enforced via authentication [8] . The first level A1 allows setting any arbitrary policy on a tuple-level. It allows implementing the full spectrum of attribute-based access control at the cost of managing a large number of keys.
The second level A2 of access control is particularly useful for item-level tracking. It allows restricting the visibility of items to someone who possessed the item without having to set access control to individual items. One can then engage in fair data sharing agreements with other parties without the risk of disclosing information about other supply chain partners -even by inference. This is the basic notion of visibility policies combined with an authorization for a specific party. Without loss of generality let that party be Alice, then we express the access control level A2 as access(s, o) = "vis" ∈ AT T R(s, o) ∧ "Alice" ∈ AT T R(s) Such visibility policies can be implemented using tuple-level access control, but we significantly reduce the number of managed keys.
The third level A3 enables including trusted parties, e.g. outsourced manufacturers or service providers. They get full access to the data of their trusting partner. This level implements access control orthogonal to visibility policies based on the ownership of the data in ones data repository. Using an example, let Alice be the service provider and Bob be the party granting access. Then we express the access control level A3 as
Consider implementing these requirements with traditional cryptography: in both symmetrical and asymmetrical encryption, one key or one key pair would be required for each tuple and for each party. Since an average supply chain produces millions of items with hundreds of supply chain partners, these methods would result in a huge number of cryptographic keys. Furthermore, cryptographic keys would need to be exchanged between parties for each item/tuple produced. Thus, both methods are unpractical.
We follow a different approach: we propose a new cryptographic scheme which only requires a random number for each item, and two cryptographic keys. And it only requires cryptographic keys to be exchanged once, i.e. new items/tuples do not require an exchange of new cryptographic keys. Our cryptographic scheme stores encrypted data in a distributed repository and finds it using a Discovery Service.
Our cryptographic scheme requires tuples containing two values:
• I: a unique identifier for the combination of one item and one party
• D: Information where the actual data lies, i.e. a data endpoint like an URL Note that I will uniquely identify all data endpoints D corresponding to one or several attributes of the item, therefore it can be used to query all D's from the Discovery Service.
The challenge of our cryptographic scheme is to on the one hand prevent an observer from inferring information about an item or company from I, but on the other hand let legitimate queries efficiently identify the tuples containing I.
We describe our cryptographic scheme following the steps in its basic procedure, cf. Furthemore, we present three ways of querying our Discovery Service:
• Client-side Computation: For all companies, the querying party will use the public key to calculate I, and then retrieve the corresponding tuple(s) from the repository.
• Server-side Computation: After receiving a query, the Discovery Service will use billinear pairings to calculate which tuple(s) correspond to the query. After that it returns these tuples.
• Chaining: The ID of the tuple of the predecessor (Company i − 1) and of the successor (Company i + 1) of an item are encrypted and stored in the tuple. This way each party with appropriate access rights can follow the information about each item up and down the supply chain.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Our implementation is based on elliptical curves. We use a group G1 = E(Fp) [ℓ] where p is a prime number longer than 512 Bit, and ℓ one that is 160 Bit long. The parameters ai, bi, ci and r are also 160 Bit long. Note that the length of the keys is sufficient, since 160 Bit in elliptic curves provides similar security to 1024 Bit RSA. For the encryption of D we use 128-Bit AES.
The parameters influencing the runtime of our cryptographic scheme are: the overall number of companies |C|, the number of companies that possessed an item |L|, and the number of tuples in the repository |DB|. We generate data to mimic a large supply chain, with the maximum size of the parameters being |C| = 10, 000; |L| = 100; and |DB| = 50 million.
Our fully functional prototype was implemented in Java (1.6.0 12, 64-Bit), using java.math.BigInteger as a large number arithmetic library. We executed the code on a Linux server with 64GB RAM, and 4 quad-core 64-Bit CPUs with 2.40GHz. The tuples were stored on a dedicated Linux server with 3GB RAM, a dual-core 32-Bit CPU with 3GHz, running PostgreSql 8. 4 .
In the demonstration we analyze the following aspects of our prototype:
• Comparison of the overall runtime of all three queries without considering parallelization
• Runtime for fetching tuples from a database with up to 50 million items
• Parallelization of cryptographic computations on the client and on the server
• Environment parameters for which each query type is the fastest
CONCLUSIONS
In this demonstration we presented a novel application of encryption for the secure implementation of a Discovery Service. Different levels of fine-grained access control can be enforced, e.g. on each item, without the need to exchange new cryptographic keys. We evaluated three ways of querying the repository: One query that relies on computations on the client side, one that relies on computations on the server side, and one that queries tuples sequentially. We performed a performance evaluation with a database containing up to 50 million tuples.
